Occasionally we are faced with a difficult question of statutory interpretation that qualifies as a "Halbert's Lumber issue." (E.g., Halbert's Lumber, Inc. v. Lucky Stores, Inc. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1233, 1235 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 298] (Halbert's Lumber) ["a real doozy of a puzzle"].) This is such a case, involving section 1312 of the Corporations Code, which generally governs the rights of minority shareholders who dissent from mergers and buyouts.
Here, the trial judge was faced with two radically different views of section 1312, subdivision (b): Plaintiffs, former minority shareholders in United PanAm Financial Corp., assert subdivision (b) should be read as a broad
The trial judge chose the more modest reading of subdivision (b), and, accordingly, sustained defendants' demurrer to the minority's suit for "rescissionary damages" based on breach of fiduciary duty. She was correct to do so and we affirm that part of the judgment. We are convinced that when section 1312 is read in light of its history and its judicial construction, no other result is tenable.
However, since the minority shareholders have never withdrawn their alternative request to set aside the merger, we cannot affirm the judgment entirely. The minority shareholders did sufficiently allege common control of the corporation, and subdivision (b) does, plainly, allow for suits to set aside or rescind mergers in common control situations. Therefore, we must reverse and remand for resolution of that question.
This case comes to us after a demurrer to the minority's second amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend.
The standard of review is particularly important in this case because the second amended complaint alleges that defendant Guillermo Bron has always controlled about 40 percent of PanAm Financial's stock throughout its history, and "no director whom Bron has supported for election has ever failed to receive the requisite number of votes for election or reelection." The pleading also alleges that in public filings in 2007 and 2008, the company actually admitted Bron would "have substantial influence" over the "management and affairs" of the company, "including the ability to control substantially all matters submitted to our shareholders for approval."
While no case law has yet interpreted subdivision (b)'s indirect common control language, we do have the holding in Hellum v. Breyer (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1300 [123 Cal.Rptr.3d 803] (Hellum) to help us. There, three "outside" — meaning nonemployee — directors of a five-director company were sued under a Corporations Code statute (§ 25504) which provides for the liability of everyone who "directly or indirectly controls" an entity that sells unqualified securities.
Applying Hellum to the case at hand, we think the allegations of Bron's common control sufficient. While Bron personally only controlled about 40 percent of PanAm Financial's stock, he still had "significant voting power" over the company. In Hellum, more than 50 percent was split three ways; here 40 percent is in the hands of one person and Bron's 40 percent "voting power" is further augmented by the absence of any indication anyone else was even close to his 40 percent at the time of the buyout. Additionally, there is his position as chairman of the board, his acknowledged power over the general affairs of the corporation, and the filings acknowledging his power to formulate key corporate policy. Together, as in Hellum, this congeries of facts readily supports an inference of at least indirect control, though such a conclusion seems no more than common sense anyway. A person who owns 40 percent of a company with the rest of the ownership not concentrated in any rival can easily put his allies on the board.
Moreover, the complaint alleges all of Bron's fellow directors owe their jobs to him, so they are dependent on his good graces. And of course in other contexts dealing with questions of indirect control, courts have recognized that economic dependence means indirect control. (E.g., S. G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of Industrial Relations (1989) 48 Cal.3d 341, 355 [256 Cal.Rptr. 543, 769 P.2d 399] [cucumber harvesters not independent contractors but really controlled by growers because economically dependent on them]; Yellow Cab Cooperative, Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1288, 1297-1298 [277 Cal.Rptr. 434] [indicia of indirect control by taxi company over taxi drivers who were dependent on the company for business].)
Having taken eight paragraphs to explain how the standard of review controls the facts of the case before us, it will take us but one to set them forth: Bron founded PanAm Financial in 1994. Basically, the corporation makes subprime loans on used cars, i.e., auto loans to the less-than-100-percent creditworthy. The company went public in the late 1990's. By 2006 the corporation's shares were selling at $26 per share, but the recession hit the company hard, and share prices dove to $5 per share at the beginning of 2008. By the end of 2008 share prices were as low as $1.59. However, PanAm Financial management instituted a number of cost-cutting measures (some draconian — including laying off 310 of its 469 employees), and reduced its portfolio of shaky auto loans, so that by May 2010, the Bron group thought the company a good opportunity to take private to benefit themselves. Accordingly, they developed a buyout scheme in which Bron and his partner, the Pine Brook Financial Group, would acquire the corporation's stock in the company on the cheap.
On January 11, Busse filed a class action for breach of fiduciary duty. The original complaint sought an injunction against the proposed buyout, but added that if the buyout was consummated prior to the judgment in the action, plaintiffs would accept either rescinding the "transaction" (presumably meaning setting aside the buyout) or an award of what they called "rescissionary damages." Nine days later, the Bortels followed suit, also alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and also seeking an injunction to prevent the reorganization, and alternatively asking for "compensatory damages" if the buyout was consummated.
No injunction was obtained. On February 24, 2011, the buyout was approved by a vote of the outstanding shares, though the vote was relatively close, about 4.8 million shares for to 4 million shares against. As far as our record shows, the buyout was consummated sometime after February 24, 2011.
Busse's and the Bortels' cases were consolidated in May 2011. By July, Busse and the Bortels had filed an amended complaint, seeking rescission, but again asking for rescissionary damages in the alternative. After several rounds of demurrers, the minority shareholders filed a second amended complaint (the operative one for purposes of this appeal), alleging two causes of action based on the facts above, namely breach of fiduciary duty under subdivision (b) of section 1312, and aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty under subdivision (b) of section 1312. Even under the second amended complaint, however, the minority shareholders were still seeking to rescind the buyout approved in February 2011 if they could not obtain rescissionary damages.
The trial court sustained the Bron group's demurrer to the second amended complaint, reasoning along two lines: First, subdivision (b) of section 1312 does not allow for damages, even when "couched" as an "equitable remedy" under the rubric of rescissionary damages. Additionally, the second amended complaint did not sufficiently allege "Bron's common control." The minority shareholders then timely filed this appeal.
The minority shareholders' claim for "rescissionary damages" centers on a single phrase in subdivision (b), which states that in common control
This principle is important because it focuses our attention on what one might expect to be there if a given interpretation were correct, but isn't. For example, in W.B., our Supreme Court noted that if the Legislature had intended, in enacting a certain statute, to expand the reach of a certain federal law, one would have expected evidence of such "intent to feature prominently in the legislative history." (W.B., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 56.) The W.B. court thus found it significant that there was no evidence of any such intent. (Ibid.)
The case before us is perfectly suited to application of this variation on the classic approach to laying out the problem of ascertaining legislative intent. Section 1312 is not the most pellucid of statutes, a fact noted twice by our high court in Steinberg. (See Steinberg, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1205-1206 ["the scope of the prohibition stated in this section is not clear ..."], 1207 ["The language of section 1312(a) does not provide a ready answer, for it is not entirely clear whether such a claim amounts to an attack on the `validity' of the merger."].) But when one examines the judicial history of section 1312, any mystery as to the Legislature's intent seems to dissipate. Taking our cue from W.B., we find no evidence the Legislature wanted, in subdivision (b) to
It all started in 1931 with the enactment of (now former) Civil Code section 369. Before that, any shareholder could block a merger by withholding consent. (See Gallois v. West End Chemical Co. (1960) 185 Cal.App.2d 765, 771 [8 Cal.Rptr. 596] (Gallois).) There were "two principal reasons" for the enactment of the statute: one was to "permit mergers over the objection of a defined minority of shareholders" while the other was to give such minority shareholders the chance to obtain compensation for their stock. (Ibid.)
The statute was given its first judicial consideration some eight years after its enactment, in Beechwood Securities Corp. v. Associated Oil Co. (9th Cir. 1939) 104 F.2d 537 (Beechwood), where minority shareholders wanted to set aside a merger they considered disadvantageous to their own interests, so they attacked the statute as an unconstitutional deprivation of private property. The Ninth Circuit turned back the constitutional challenge (id. at pp. 540-541) in an opinion stressing the complexity of trying to unwind a merger. (See id. at p. 541 [noting the "injustice of disturbing the vast and complicated interests of the consolidated companies because of a contention which the dissentient shareholder had not raised"].) The Beechwood court then summarized the law, as if speaking to a disappointed minority shareholder, in vibrant language that would be quoted 47 years later in Steinberg: "In effect, these code sections, as construed by both parties, say to a shareholder, `When you buy stock in a California corporation you are advised that your associate shareholders holding two-thirds of the shares may consolidate your corporation with another into a third corporation, offer you what they please of its shares in exchange for those you hold, and, if you do not like the offer, may buy out your shares at their fair market value at the time they vote the consolidation.'" (Id. at p. 540, italics added; see Steinberg, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1206, fn. 11 [quoting same passage].)
When Beechwood was decided in 1939, there was no equivalent to what is today section 1312, subdivision (b). But there was an equivalent of section 1312, subdivision (a), namely Civil Code former section 369, subdivision (17), which the court helpfully quoted in a footnote.
Ballantine and Sterling emphasized an interesting fact about the Beechwood decision — it clearly arose out of a common control situation. There, a parent owned more than 98 percent of two companies which were then merged into the parent. The minority stockholders of one of the companies basically thought they were getting a much worse exchange rate than the stockholders of the other company. (See Ballantine & Sterling 1939 article, supra, 27 Cal. L.Rev. at pp. 652-655.)
In 1947, Civil Code former section 369 was converted into Corporations Code former section 4123, which was then followed by former sections 4300
From 1931 to 1947 the statute grew longer, but the key language precluding attacks on reorganizations "at law or in equity" except for appraisal remained.
The appellate court reversed, reasoning that under the law the commissioner had no choice. (See Giannini, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at pp. 154-156.) The important point of the opinion for our purposes is that the Giannini court issued a strong assertion of the exclusivity of the holdout stockholder's appraisal remedy. In fact, it quoted Ballantine and Sterling's general corporate law treatise in echoing its concern that the point of the statutory scheme was to prevent extortion of the many by the few: "The statutory procedures whereby the dissenting shareholder may demand and receive cash for his shares in an amount equal to their fair market value, is exclusive of other legal and equitable remedies by which minority shareholders might seek to enjoin or attack changes such as a merger or consolidation, except on the question of an insufficient vote to authorize a merger or consolidation. (Corp. Code, § 4123.) It has been said in this connection that `It was deemed advisable to protect the majority against strike suits by abrogating equitable remedies by way of injunction or rescission to litigate charges of fraud or unfairness, which may be used to extort a settlement by obstruction of a transaction duly authorized.' (Ballantine on Corporations (1946), p. 703.) Professor Ballantine was speaking with reference to the provisions of former section 369 of the Civil Code, the substance of which has now been incorporated in sections 4109 et seq. of the Corporations Code. "The crucial point at issue in equitable suits for rescission and also for preventive relief against merger or consolidation is after all usually one of price, as to the true exchange value of the dissenting shares, perhaps of only a small number of shares. The confining of litigation with dissenters to the question of value and compensation simplifies the issues to be tried and protects all parties.' (Ballantine on Corporations, supra.)" (Giannini, supra, 240 Cal.App.2d at pp. 154-155, italics added.)
The final case in the journey to 1975's enactment of section 1312 was Jackson v. Maguire (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 120 [75 Cal.Rptr. 16] (Jackson). Jackson arose out of litigation in which cashed-out minority shareholders in one of the divisions of the conglomerate sought additional consideration for their shares. The trial court disagreed, and substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding so the judgment was affirmed. (See id. at p. 128 ["We,
Beechwood, Gallois, Giannini and Jackson thus formed the existing case law construing former section 4123, as it stood going into 1975, when the Legislature recodified the statute into what is now section 1312, subdivision (a) and, at the same time, added new section 1312, subdivision (b), plus reincarnating the process-of-appraisal statutes into new sections 1300 through 1311. At least three of the four cases leading up to the 1975 enactment involved common control situations.
It fell to the court in Sturgeon Petroleums, Ltd. v. Merchants Petroleum Co. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 134 [195 Cal.Rptr. 29] (Sturgeon) to first explore the statutory scheme enacted in 1975, its current form. Sturgeon involved this scenario: Oil company M was to be merged into Oil company D. The merger was approved by an "`overwhelming'" majority of the shares of the M company. (Id. at p. 136.) The shareholders of M company who voted against the merger were offered a price of $2.94 for their shares, but they demanded to be cashed out at $12 per share. The D company then took the initiative and it filed an appraisal action under section 1304. The dissenting M company stockholders countered with an action for damages based on breach of fiduciary duty against M company, its respective board members, D company, and its board chairman. (Sturgeon, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at pp. 136-137.) D company then sought summary judgment on the theory appraisal was the plaintiffs' exclusive remedy. The trial court granted it and the appellate court affirmed.
The Sturgeon court had this insight: The language of section 1312, subdivision (a) "taken at face value," indeed "might possibly be susceptible" to the interpretation it does not preclude "`direct actions for damages if fraud or other misconduct can be shown.'" (Sturgeon, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 139.)
Then came the California Supreme Court opinion in Steinberg. The Sturgeon decision survived Steinberg scrutiny quite nicely; the two decisions are on the same wavelength. Steinberg put its imprimatur on Sturgeon's basic conclusion that in subdivision (a) situations, appraisal is the exclusive remedy.
But there was a lot more to the Steinberg decision than just its holding there are no damages in subdivision (a) situations. For one thing, Steinberg followed Sturgeon in spotting a certain ambiguity in the language of section 1312, subdivision (a). And, like Sturgeon, Steinberg reached its result by noting the context and history of the statute to arrive at the more reasonable of two possible interpretations. Thus Steinberg considered section 1312 in the
But perhaps the most remarkable aspect of Steinberg is its endorsement of appraisal as a truly adequate remedy. Steinberg pointed out that even breaches of fiduciary duty could be redressed in appraisal proceedings, because any difference between the true value of the minority stockholders' shares and the value offered minority shareholders could readily be accounted for in the appraisal.
And finally, to validate our understanding of Steinberg, we consider the dissent. Steinberg was a four-three decision, and Chief Justice Bird made no effort to hide her displeasure with the majority's result. But she accepted the implication of the historical origins of section 1312 — 40 years previously the Legislature had seen dissenting shareholders as "`piratical obstructionists.'" (See Steinberg, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1216, quoting Ballantine & Sterling 1939 article (dis. opn. of Bird, C. J.).) However, she decried the original view as "`anachronistic'" as shown by unidentified "current events." (42 Cal.3d at pp. 1216-1217.) For Chief Justice Bird, and her colleagues Justices Reynoso and Grodin, the majority result was a "license to commit fraud" (id. at p. 1220), and appraisal was not a remedy which could "adequately compensate those individuals who have been damaged in a corporate merger or reorganization" (id. at p. 1214). Clearly, the dissent read Steinberg as we do.
As to the first assertion, the Singhania court's analysis was that the omission of the fair market value in the information materials sent to the shareholders didn't prejudice the plaintiffs: They knew their corporation had a legal duty to state a fair market value (per § 1300), they didn't use their right to make a lawful demand to inspect corporate records (see § 1600 et seq.), the omission of a fair market value was functionally no different from a deflated statement — as is usually alleged (and was in Steinberg) — and, in any event, the shareholders were still safeguarded by the fact they could obtain the fair market value of their shares in an appraisal. (See Singhania, supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at pp. 430-433.) As to the misconduct, there was no allegation the plaintiff shareholders had been misled by the misinformation or material nondisclosures into keeping their stock instead of cashing out. Their failure to exercise their dissenters' rights was their own "de facto choice" to accept the reorganization. (Id. at p. 434.) Moreover, there was no misconduct in the actual process of the merger, i.e., it wasn't a case where the plaintiff shareholders were shorted what they were supposed to receive from the company into which their former company had been merged. (Id. at pp. 434-435.)
With this background, we may now examine the minority shareholders' core argument in this case. The minority read subdivision (b) to provide that in the absence of subdivision (a) application, shareholders retain common law rights, including the right to sue a controlling majority for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty.
We reject the argument for two reasons. The first we have alluded to already: The historical context in which subdivision (b) was first enacted. As we have seen, by 1975, a string of California cases had already held that appraisal was the exclusive remedy of dissenting shareholders. The Legislature must be presumed to have been aware of these cases in 1975 when it enacted subdivision (b). Going into 1975, then, there was no residuum of common law remedies in the reorganization context which would exist but for the interposition of subdivision (a).
Here, similarly, we have no indication the Legislature, in enacting subdivision (b), wanted to give subdivision (b) plaintiffs a right to monetary damages which, under Beechwood, Gallois, and Giannini, they clearly did not have at the time. The silence is particularly loud given that those three cases had arisen out of common control situations, so the 1975 amendments presented the perfect opportunity to say that monetary damages could be sought if a reorganization did involve common control.
Moreover, a monetary remedy in subdivision (b) — outside the well-delineated appraisal remedy provided for in section 1304 — would also tend to subvert the appraisal remedy itself and allow the kind of gamesmanship the statutes indicate the Legislature sought to avoid by passing section 1308. Specifically, sections 1302 and 1304 set out strict time limits to exercise the appraisal remedy, while section 1308 prevents the dissenting shareholder from reneging on a demand for a cash-out without the corporation's consent. Section 1308 was obviously included to prevent dissenting shareholders from giving themselves a free stock option in the event that after the reorganization share prices declined. A common law remedy for monetary damages would allow dissenting stockholders to hedge their bets by disclaiming an appraisal remedy on the theory the company's offer was submarket as a result of breach of fiduciary duty, and if the gamble didn't pay off because share prices unexpectedly went down, they could simply dismiss their case. The effect would be the same as a free stock option. We cannot ascribe that intent to the framers of the statutory scheme.
Of course, resolving what subdivision (b) doesn't say does not tell us what subdivision (b) does say. Recall that the overarching theme of both Beechwood and Ballantine and Sterling's 1939 article was the intolerability of the uncertainty created by a suit to set aside or rescind a merger. However, by 1975 the potential for abuse in common control situations was known, and something more than just appraisal as a remedy was perceived to be needed by the Legislature. (See Dunn's Steinberg Article, supra, 22 U.S.F. L.Rev. at p. 314 ["The scope of exclusivity of the appraisal remedy has been narrowed by the legislature to exclude those cases in which abuses might be expected. Most notably, the appraisal remedy is not exclusive if there is common control of the acquiring and acquired corporations."].)
That something more was what Beechwood and Ballantine and Sterling in 1939 would have seen as the horror of the uncertainty of litigation which might, or might not, result in unwinding a merger — or, to use the metaphor employed at oral argument at the trial court in this case — the unscrambling of an egg. The Legislature faced that eventuality. It recognized, at least on an intuitive level, that unlike most buyer and seller scenarios where the seller knows more about what's being sold than the buyer, the natural order is
Common control under subdivision (b), then, is one of those times when the Legislature is willing to allow a little dice to be played over the survivability of a corporate reorganization. Subdivision (b) is like physicist Schrödinger's famous cat in a box, which might, or might not, have been exposed to a puff of deadly gas. If a management buyout were analogized to that cat, one would never know if the box contains a live cat or a dead cat until the outcome of the set-aside litigation becomes final and the box, so to speak, is opened. Given the history of subdivision (a) with its antipathy to litigation seeking to set aside corporate reorganizations, it is evident that the Legislature had a different attitude for subdivision (b) common control situations: It was willing to tolerate some dead cats to keep management honest.
The trial court sustained the demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend, in part because it correctly determined that the minority shareholders of PanAm Financial had no claim for monetary relief. They had their chance with that by way of appraisal. But the second amended complaint also seeks to set aside the buyout of PanAm Financial by Bron et al., and an examination of the record reveals the minority shareholders have never given up that alternative request. To be sure, the trial judge pressed them to give it up. The judge understandably did not want to unscramble any eggs. Even so, counsel for the shareholders managed to bob, weave and duck around the trial judge's efforts, so in the end he did not waive the request for the alternative of a set aside.
The judgment is affirmed to the extent it precludes plaintiffs from seeking any damage remedy, including "rescissionary damages." It is reversed to the extent it precludes on demurrer plaintiffs from seeking to unwind the buyout of PanAm Financial by Bron and friends. Beyond determining that the second amended complaint alleges a cause of action for unwinding of the buyout under subdivision (b) of section 1312, we express no opinion. This result is a split decision, so each side will bear its own costs on appeal.
Rylaarsdam, Acting P. J., and Moore, J., concurred.
After the passage, the court would quote subdivision (b) in a footnote, and then launch into its basic analysis, including emphasizing that appraisal was an adequate remedy even when there is a breach of fiduciary duty. (See Steinberg, supra, 42 Cal.3d at pp. 1208-1209; see especially id. at p. 1209.) In any event, the passage from Steinberg quoted above, which merely tells us what defendants were telling the court, cannot be viewed as establishing anything more than that subdivision (b) does not throw much light on subdivision (a).